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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for the acceleration of a note
secured by a mortgage which was given in partial payment for
the purchase of a farm*
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the Court sitting without
a jury.

Judgment was granted for Plaintiffs in the amount of

$18,023.50 plus interest at the rate of 5-1/2% per annum from
July 1, 1973, to date of Judgment plus attorneys fees in the
amount "of $2,000.00.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and the
reinstatement of the note, providing for installment payments
with costs and attorney fees awarded to Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early part of 1971, the Wanlasses, who are the
Defendants in this action, began looking for a farm to buy.
The Williamsons, who are the Plaintiffs in this action, heard
that Wanlasses were looking and approached them with an offer
to sell their farm.

At that point, the Wanlasses went to

Attorney Charles P. Olson and discussed the negotiations.
Mr. Olson prepared an Offer to Purchase for the Wanlasses.
(Tr. 9-11)

This offer was changed several times, but after

more negotiations the offer was finally accepted by the Williamsons.
(Ex. 1)
It turned out that Mr. Olson had represented the
Williamsons in the past and Mr. Olson prepared the papers for
both parties. As a matter of course, the Wanlasses went to
Mr. Olson's office and signed the documents which had been
prepared.

Both parties relied on Mr. Olson for legal advice

in this matter and each paid for his services. (Tr. 19-2 0)
Sometime later a dispute arose over some hay which
had been involved in the original deal and Attorney Olson acted
as arbitrator.

He negotiated a settlement between the parties

which was satisfactory to both.
-2-

(Tr. 21-22)

The original deal which was negotiated called for
a down payment of $1975.00, $89,000.00 to be paid at the time
of closing of a loan, and $20,000.00 to be paid in installments.
The Offer to Purchase stated that this $20,000.00 was to be
represented by a promissory note secured by machinery and farm
equipment.

The note which was executed on May 1, 1971, states

that it was secured by a second mortgage on real estate and was
to be paid in equal monthly installments of $163.42 until paid
off.

(Ex. 2)

(A financing statement on the machinery was filed

and a mortgage on real estate was recorded in connection with
this note.)

(Ex. 9, 10)

The note payments commenced on June 1, 1971, and were
current in June, 1973.

(Tr. 31)

All of the payments were mailed

to the Williamsons1 address in Hyrum, Utah, and were made by
check.

No objection was ever made to payment by check through

the mails.

(Tr. 49-50)

Approximately 15 of the 25 payments

made to that time were not paid on exactly the first day of each
month.

In a couple of instances the payments were made more

than a month late.

However, the payments were made up in the

succeeding months so that as of June 30, 1973, all payments
were up to date.

(Ex. 5)

Mrs. Williamson called when the payments got behind
in May or June of 1972 and the Wanlasses brought the payments
current.

In February of 1973, the payments got behind again

and the Williamsons called Attorney Olson and asked him to
write a letter to the Wanlasses and ask them to bring the
payments current.

After that letter the payments were made

on time through June, 1973,
Mr. Wanlass prepared a check on or about the 9th
day of July, which he deposited in the mail in an envelope
addressed to the Williamsons in Hyrum.
payment was never received by them.

Apparently that

(Tr. 90-92)

Then on

the 1st of August, Mr. Wanlass made out a check to the
Williamsons which was apparently not mailed until the evening
of the 6th of August or sometime on the morning of the 7th,
since the letter was postmarked August 7, A.M.,

(Ex. 8)

On August 3, the Williamsons went to Attorney Olson
who prepared a note of acceleration which was received by
the Wanlasses on August 7, after the August payment had been
mailed.

(Tr. 105? Ex. 4)

As soon as the notice was received

Mr. Wanlass unsuccessfully tried to call Mr. Williamson.
(Tr. 101)

He then stopped payment on the July check since

the notice indicated it had not been received.

(Ex. 27)-

He immediately wrote a letter and a new check for the July
payment and mailed them to the Williamsons.

(Tr. 38; Ex. 6,7)

Every payment, up to and including the date of the
trial, was tendered to the Williamsons or their attorney.
None of the checks after the June 1973 check have been
cashed.

After the notice of acceleration, the Williamsons

proceeded to file a law suit for collection of the note.

ARGUMENT
I. CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ACCELERATION
CLAUSES IS GOVERNED BY GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
AND EQUITY, UTAH CASE LAWf AND NOT JUST THE
COMMERCIAL CODE,
One of the issues which arose in District Court
was which law was to apply to the construction and enforcement
of acceleration clauses in a promissory note executed as part
of a real estate transaction.

Plaintiffs contended that

Article 3 of the Commercial Code was the only law which was
to apply to the promissory note since it was a negotiable
instrument.

A corollary to this argument was that Utah law

dealing with acceleration clauses in mortgages and real estate
contracts had no application to this case.

The Defendants

have taken the position that the construction and enforcement
of a promissory note executed as part of a real estate transaction and secured by a mortgage is governed by Utah case law
and the general principles of law and equity as well as the
UCC.
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals
with the negotiability of instruments.

The only provision

which mentions acceleration is UCA 70A-3-109 dealing with
payment at definite time.

That provision merely states that

negotiability is not affected by an acceleration provision.
There is no provision in Article 3 dealing with the construction
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or enforceability of acceleration clauses.

In fact, the

only provision which deals with those questions is UCA
70A-1-2G8 which says essentially, "A term providing that
one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment...
f

at will1 or fwhen he deems himself insecure1 or words of

similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have
power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment...is impaired.11
Outside of these references, there is nothing in
the Commercial Code which deals with acceleration clauses.
Furthermore, the Code itself states that all of the documents
executed in relation to a particular transaction are merely
parts of the whole. A particular part cannot be isolated
without reference to the whole transaction. UCA 70A-3-119(1)
states in parts
"As between the obligor and his immediate obligee
or any transferee, the terms of an instrument may
be modified or affected by any other written agreement
executed as a part of the same transaction..."
A recent North Dakota decision referred to that
statefs counterpart of the above section in stating:
"(this section) applies to negotiable instruments
the general rule that writings executed as part
of the same transaction are to be read together as
a single agreement because, as between the immediate
parties, a negotiable instrument is merely a
contract and is no exception to the rule that
the courts will look to the entire contract in
writing." Sanden v. Hansen 201 WW2d 404 (N.D. 1972).
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The implication of this rule is that all of the documents
executed in this transaction can be looked to for relevant
provisions to show the nature of the entire transaction*
Further, the transaction was in real estate and the
installment note was secured by a mortgage.

As this court

stated in American Savings v. Blomquist 21 Utah 2d 2892,
445 Pld 1 (1968) at 4:
"The Courts proceed on the theory that the note
and mortgage, though separate instruments, are
not separate contracts, but, being executed at the
same time and in the course of the same transaction,
constitute a single contract."
In light of this rule, it is difficult to see how it could
be argued that the promissory note is to be enforced solely
under the provisions of Article 3.
As pointed out by UCA 70A*~1«~103, unless displaced
by a particular provision of the UCC, the general principles
of law and equity supplement its provisions.

Although it

is clear that acceleration clauses are allowed to be included
in instruments without affecting their negotiability, Article
3 says nothing about the interpretation or enforceability of
such clauses.

In fact, we must go to UCA 7QA~i~208 to get

what information there is in the Commercial Code on the law
of enforcing such clauses.
The "other written agreements executed as part
of the same transaction" in this case include an offer to
purchase, a trust deed, a mortgage, and a financing statement

on equipment. All of these together show the existence of
a real estate transaction accompanied by the sale of personal
property.

Further, the note in question was secured by equip-

ment (as evidenced by the offer to purchase and the financing
statement) as well as a mortgage on real property (as stated
on the note). In this particular case, attorneys for Plaintiff
and Defendant agreed that the plaintiff would not tie up
the collateral and interfere with the operation of the farm
while the note was being litigated.
The Commercial Code does not attempt to cover every
possible issue that can arise in connection with commercial
transactions.

In fact, 70A-1-103 states:

Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this act, the principles of law and equity...
shall supplement its provisions."
It should be apparent from this discussion that
all of the writings in this transaction should be looked
at by the Court.

Unless displaced by particular provisions

of the Code, the general principles of lav; and equity apply,
and the application of these principles should be determined
by an examination of Utah case law in similar fact situations.
II. COURSE OF DEALING AND PERFORMANCE ESTABLISHED
THE TIME AND MODE OF PAYMENT
The time and mode of payment under this note were
established over a period of two years between the parties.
The evidence was conclusive that the Plaintiffs had accepted
check payments mailed to their Hyrum address from the beginning

of the agreement.

The rule appears to be that if the creditor

has authorized use of the mails for payment, payment is made
when the letter containing the payment is deposited in the
mail with postage prepaid.

This applies to payments by check

even though the check may not clear the bank for several
days after deposit. United Security Corp. v. Franklin 180
A2d 505, See, 60 Am. Jur. 2d "Payment"§11.

The mode of payment

can be established by course of dealing and if the obligee
has agreed to receive payment by mail the risk of loss in
the event of non-delivery falls on the creditor.

The deposit

of a letter in the mail containing a check constitutes payment
and a delay in delivery cannot be the basis for working a
forfeiture and does not constitute a default.

See, Mutual

Reserve v. Tuchfeld, 159 F 833 and 6C Am. Jur. 2d , "Payment"
§17.
III. TENDER OF OVERDUE PAYMENTS WAS MADE BEFORE
OPTION TO ACCELERATE WAS EXERCISED AND CUT
OFF RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE OPTION.
In this case, the acceleration clause of the promissory
note stated, "If any installment is not paid at the time
it becomes due, the holders of this note, at their option,
may declare the whole due and payable, in which event interest
shall commence to run at the rate of eight (8%) percent per
annum on the entire amount due, from date of notice until
paid."

(emphasis added)
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As can be seen, this particular provision gives
the holders of this note an option to acclerate.

This Court

has adopted the general rule as to clauses of this type.
Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161 P2d
355 at 358.
"Under a contract which provides that any
default in the payment of the interest of
an installment of the principal when due shall
give the obligee an option to declare the
whole amount due, the general rule is that a
tender of payment of the overdue principal or
interest before the option to declare the whole
debt due has been exercised cuts off the right
to exercise the option."
The facts in this case, along with the rules on mode and
time of payment, establish that a tender of the overdue principal
was made before the option was exercised.

It is undisputed

that the July payment was placed in the mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to Plaintiffs on or about the 9th of July.

It

is also undisputed that the payment for August was mailed
prior to the receipt of Plaintiff's notice of acceleration,
on either the 6th or 7th of August*

Since the risk of loss

is on Plaintiff when the accepted mode of payment is by mail
and no forfeiture can be worked against Defendants on that
basis, the July payment cannot be used to show default.
Then, prior to the receipt of the notice of acceleration
in which Plaintiffs supposedly exercised their option, tender
of the August payment had already been made by mail under
the rules concerning the time of payment when made by mail.

Application of the Home Owner's case to these facts
shows that the right to exercise the option had been cut
off* The notice of acceleration itself relied on the nonreceipt of the July payment as well as the August payment
as the basis for acceleration:
"You are notified that you are delinquent for
the month of July, and that the August 1st payment,
has not been paid, and the undersigned hereby elect
to declare the entire amount due and payable.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1973."
Not only can the Plaintiffs not rely on the nonreceipt of the July payment, but since the payments were
made by mail, the 3rd day of August is not allowing sufficient
time for the receipt of a payment even if made on the 1st.
All of these facts and circumstances should be
viewed in light of this comment by the New Mexico Supreme
Court.
"A court of equity will scan very closely the
enforcement of an acceleration clause which will
work great hardship on the debtor." Carmichael
V. Rice, 158 P2d 290 (NM, 1945) at 29TI
—
The actions of the creditor in this case simply do
not conform to the standards set forth by this Court and others
to govern the construction and exercise of acceleration clauses.
IV. UTAH LAW REQUIRING NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND
REASONABLE TIME TO BRING CONTRACT CURRENT
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE
A fairly recent Utah case not only required the Seller
to give notice of default before exercising his options because

of a failure on the part of the purchaser to pay an installment
as promised, but it required a reasonable time allowance for
the purchaser to bring the contract current.

This case is

Lamont v. Evjen 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P2d 532 (1973).

While

the particular facts deal with a uniform real estate contract,
the same protections for the buyer which are stated there
should apply to this case. In fact, Lamont dealt with the
right to accelerate the amount prior to mortgage foreclosure
so technically it is not a foreclosure action.

Had the buyer

in this case opted to invoke the one action rule set forth
in UCA 78-37-1 (Supp)., the procedures that would have been
followed would have been identical to those in Lamont.
When the Lamont case is considered in light of
the rule that the general rules of law and equity are to
supplement Commercial Code provisions, the importance of
this case becomes apparent.

In that case, this Court upheld

the lower court which granted a dismissal on the following
grounds:
"It appears that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that they gave notice to the Defendants
of their election to treat the contract as a note
and mortgage prior to a full tender of the amount
due. Besides, the defendants were not given a
reasonable time in which to make good the delinquent
installment.,f
Obviously, these terms were not complied with in
the instant case.

-12-

There was a provision in the note which allegedly
waived notice of non-payments
"The makers, sureties, guarantors, and
endorsers hereof severally waive presentment
for payment and notice of non-payment of
this note."
This provision may not appear to be too onerous as far as
commercial practice is concerned until it is remembered that
both parties were represented by the same counsel (which
point will be discussed later) and particularly in light
of the fact that payments were made by mail.

If payments

were to be made in person, then this provision may have been
acceptable, but when the risk of loss is on the creditor
as in this case, it is unconscionable for the creditor to
be able to exercise default options without giving notice
of non-payment and an opportunity to made good any lost payments.
Even if the Lamont case could be distinguished
because of its facts, the general attitude of the Courts
in respect to acceleration clauses has been expressed in
10 CJS 748 Bills & Notes §251.
"An acceleration clause is to be construed as
any other provision in a contract, and is to
be governed by the usual rules applicable to
the construction of contracts. It has been held,
however, that a contract to accelerate the
maturity of a debt gives a remedy that is harsh
in its nature, and the provision therefor, in order
to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal;
and, if there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning
of the terms employed, preference should be given
to that construction which will avoid the forfeiture
and prevent acceleration of maturity."
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All of the above indicates that this Court should
look very closely at the acceleration clause and also apply
the Lamont case in requiring notice of default and a reasonable
time to correct any default.
V. THE COMMERCIAL CODE REQUIRES THAT ACCELERATION
CLAUSES BE EXERCISED ONLY IN GOOD FAITH BELIEF
THAT PROSPECT OF PAYMENT IS IMPAIRED
The main concern of Article 3 of the UCC on Commercial
Paper is negotiability.

This fact can be gleaned from a

quick perusal of the section headings, but is also explicit
in the comments to UCA 7QA-3-1Q9. The section makes it clear
that the addition of an acceleration clause does not affect
negotiability, but it refers us to other law for the resolution
of construction and enforceability problems.

Comment 4

to §3-109 states that potential abuse of acceleration clauses
is governed by §1-208.
"So far as certainty of time of payment is
concerned a note payable at a definite time
but subject to acceleration is no less certain
than a note payable on demand, whose negotiability
never has been questioned. It is in fact more
certain, since it at least states a definite time
beyond which the instrument cannot run. Objection
to the acceleration clause must be based on tKe
possibility of abuse by the" holder, which has"
nothing to do with negotiability and is not limited
to negotiable instruments. That problem is now
covered by Section 1-&Q8." (emphasis added)
Section 1-208 will be discussed below, but the
comment goes on to state that the Commercial Code does not
take a position on certain construction problems since the
abuse has no effect on negotiability:

"Subsection (1) (c) is intended to mean that the
certainty of time of payment or the negotiability
of the instrument is not affected by any acceleration
clause-, whether acceleration be at the option of the
maker or the holder, or automatic upon the occurrence
of some event, and whether it be conditional or
unrestricted* If the acceleration term itself is
uncertain it may fail on ordinary contract principles;
but the instrument then remains negotiable and is
payable' at the definite time," (emphasis added)
The Code position on acceleration clauses, at least
in Article 3, is that the absence or presence of such clauses
does not affect negotiability*

Article 3 takes no position

on thie construction or effect of such clauses but refers
us to Section 1-208 for solution of one particular problem
and for the solution of others refers us to "ordinary contract
principles,"
Section 1-208 (which of course is not part of Article
3 but is in the "General Provision" Article of the Code)
states:
"Section 1-208. Option to Accelerate at Will:
A term providing that one party or his successor
in interest may accelerate payment or performance
or require collateral or additional collateral
"at will" or "when he deems himself insecure" or
in words of similar import shall be construed to
mean that he shall have power to do so only if
he in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired* The burden
of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised*"
A careful reading of the language in the note in
this case shows that it is not exactly the type of clause
referred to in the above section, but the assumption can

—1~> —

probably be drawn that there is "good faith" belief requirement
that the prospect of payment is impaired or the option to
accelerate cannot be exercised.

The note states:

"If any installment is not paid at the time it
becomes due, the holders of this note, at their
option, may declare the whole due and payable,
in which event interest shall commence to run at
the rate of eight (8%) percent per annum on the
entire amount due, from date of notice until paid."
The philosophy of Section 1-208 seems to go along
with the ideas expressed in 11 Am. Jur. 2d "Bills and Notes,"
§174:
"One who advances money to another for a
specified time on the strength of commercial
paper usually wishes to protect himself if
the credit risk changes prior to maturity. Such
protection is afforded by acceleration clauses..."
In other words, the purpose of an acceleration
clause is to protect the creditor in case the debtor appears
to be defaulting completely on his debt and to save the creditor
the trouble of having to sue separately on each payment as
it becomes due.

The Commercial Code requires that the creditor

have a good faith belief that the prospect of payment is
impaired.

See, §1-203. The whims of the creditor is not

a sufficient basis for acceleration.

In fact, if the prospect

of payment was impaired why was Plaintiff willing to sue
on the note and leave the security alone?

In the instant

case, a better remedy than acceleration would appear to be
the addition of additional interest as provided for in the
note:

— 1

C-

"Any delinquent installment shall bear interest
at the rate of eight (8%) percent from the date
therefore until paid."
This remedy was not even threatened despite continued late
payments.
It is clear from the evidence that while the Wanlasses
were often late in their payments, they always made up any
late payments and, in fact, have continued to tender the
regular installments to the present time.

If the Williamsons

were concerned about late payments, they had the right to
assess interest in an effort to make the Wanlasses pay on
time, which remedy would have been much more equitable.
As pointed out above, Section 1-208 covers only
a particular type of acceleration clause.

For interpretation

and enforcement of clauses of other types we must rely on
the "good faith" requirement and ordinary contract principles
and general rules of law and equity.
VI. A COURT OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT ALLOW
ACCELERATION IN THIS CASE
As discussed above, since an acceleration clause
is a harsh remedy, in making the full amount due and increasing
the interest rate, this Court should look very closely, both
at the clause itself and its exercise to determine whether
it can equitably be enforced. Looking at the facts in this
case, this Court should refuse to enforce it.

A look at the facts in this case does not even support
the contention that a default existed.

The payments were

made a few days late, but that leeway was certainly established
by course of performance (between the parties) both as to
mode and time of payment.

Even though the express terms of

the agreement may waive such notice, the Utah Supreme Court
has recognized situations in which notice may nevertheless
be required.

Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P2d 401

(1942) at 403. Quoting a California Court:
"The requirement of notice after the receipt of
overdue payments without objection is based on the
equitable consideration that by his conduct the
vendor has led the vendee into the belief that the
former will continue to waive the strict performance
of the contract. The principle of equitable estoppel
is involved."
A Court of equity, looking at the enforcement of an acceleration
clause very closely, should consider the fact that the notice
dated August 3 cited the delinquent payment of July as well
as a late payment for August as the reason for acceleration.
Since it is undisputed that the mode of payment had always
been by mail and that Plaintiffs had never objected to that
mode and the risk of loss was therefore, on Plaintiffs, it
would appear to be grossly inequitable as well as showing
lack of good faith for Plaintiffs to accelerate without giving
notice and allowing Defendants to correct the default. Essentially, the loss of the July payment is no basis at all for
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acceleration under the above law, and August 3rd is not allowing
much time for a timely August payment, with the mails as they
are now.
Even if the August payment had been mailed on August
1, it is very possible that it may not have arrived until
a day or two after August 3.
August 3, was on a Friday.

This is especially true since

As pointed out earlier, there

is a requirement under the UCC that acceleration clauses can
only be exercised in "good faith."

This transaction on the

part of Plaintiffs certainly does not appear to meet that
test.

After not receiving a mail payment, it would at least

be better to check and see if that payment was sent before
accelerating.

Certainly the prospect of payment was not impaired.

In fact, the August 3rd notice was not notice at all,
since at the time notice was received, Wanlass tendered payment
and that tender was refused.
tells of a fait accompli?

Of what good is a notice that

This is particularly critical where

the evidence is that the Wanlasses, at this time, did not know
what the due dates were for sure, since they did not have a
copy of the contract in their possession.

(Tr. pp. 87-88)

Plaintiffs' claim that they were damaged because
the payments were late is placed in doubt when it can be seen
from looking at the checks which are in evidence that many
of them were not cashed until some time after their receipt.

If they wanted payment on the first day of each month, they
should have inserted a note that time is of the essence or
required tender of the money personally, rather than by mail.
Yet never was a protest made as to the mode of payment.
Although it was established that Mrs. Williamson
had called Mrs. Wanlass a couple of times and asked for the
payments to be on time, this was when the payments were a
month or more overdue.

There was a letter sent by Attorney

Olson, but even though it asked for payments to be made on
time, it did not change the mode of payment.
Even if the Court should hold that the Wanlasses
have defaulted under the contract, the alleged defaults have
been so inconsequential that the defense of substantial performance
should preclude the Plaintiffs from declaring a default.
Substantial performance is defined as follows:
"Exists where there has been no willful departure
from the terms of the contract, and no omission
in essential points, and the contract has been
honestly and faithfully performed in its material
and substantial particulars, and the only variance
from the strict and literal performance consists
of technical or unimportant omissions or defects."
Black's Law Dictionary.
The facts show that the payments have been made within
a reasonable time following the due date and that any damage to
the Seller would be very nominal especially in light of the fact
that some of the Defendants1 checks have not been negotiated
by the Plaintiffs for some 30 days after their issuance.
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In the final analysis, not only do Plaintiffs'
actions fail to meet the standards imposed under Utah case
law but also fail to meet basic equity standards.
VII. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN THIS CASE WAS
LIMITED BY FACT THAT BOTH PARTIES RELIED
ON SAME ATTORNEY
The evidence shows that Defendant first approached
Attorney Olson to draft the offer to purchase.
were included in the discussion.

Later Plaintiffs

Attorney Olson completed

all of the agreements and they were signed in his office.
The evidence is that he did not even discuss the general "boiler
plate" terms of the note.

He later acted as arbitrator between

the two parties in a dispute over hay.

It was not until the

Complaint was filed that Wanlasses realized that Mr. Olson was
acting as the Williamsons1 attorney.
In light of these circumstances, it is difficult
to conceive how the various provisions of the note can be
strictly construed against the Wanlasses.

They were relying

on Attorney Olson not only in drafting the instruments to
protect both parties with fair provisions but also in arbitration.
The notice which was sent in February. certainly does not
read as a warning that acceleration is imminent if payments
are a day or two late. The letter begins "Dear Folks/1 and
refers to payments as much as two or three months late. It

continues, "In a spirit of harmony, it would be nice if the
payments could be made on time so there would not be any further
friction arise. With kind regards, we are..."
This could be construed as a reminder that payments
two or three months late were not acceptable, but certainly
does not put Wanlasses on notice that payment a few days late
would be unacceptable, or which of the several remedies would
be imposed and how.

In fact, he alludes to "certain remedies"

which, if aggravated, they will pursue*

As pointed out above,

the most logical remedy to pursue would not be acceleration
but the interest penalty.

The fact that the Wanlasses considered

they were represented by Attorney Olson not only has impact
on the acceleration clause, but also on the "waiver" of presentment
for payment and notice of non-payments.
At some point in time, the attorney could not be
representing both parties because of the differences involved.
At that point the Wanlasses were entitled to receive the information necessary to protect themselves.

Olson's position

was not clear until the August 3rd letter.

They should have

been made aware exactly what would be required of them to
avoid acceleration.

This standard is stated in a recent

California case:
Lysick v. Walcom 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 28 ALR 3d 363
Ca1. (1968) at 379. "Where an attorney represents
two clients with divergent or conflicting interests

in the same subject matter, the Lucas rule demands
that the attorney must disclose all facts and circumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of
ordinary skill and capacity, are necessary to
enable his client to make free and intelligent
decisions regarding the subject matter of the
representation."
After all, Defendants1 intent was not to default
on the note.

In fact, if Attorney Olson had continued in

capacity as an arbitrator this dispute could probably have
been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties as had been
the case previously.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of acceleration clauses is to protect
persons who advance money to another if the credit risk
changes prior to maturity.
commercial purpose.

In that way it serves a valid

This is not one of those cases. As bet-

ween two farmers, and because of the custom which was established in the course of these payments, it would seem to be
patently inequitable to enforce this acceleration clause
strictly according to the language of the note.

Not only

were the Wanlasses relying on an attorney to protect their
interests, but the practice between the parties over the two
years established a different custom in the payment procedure.
It is to be noted that the month prior to the loss of the
July payment, everything was current and there is no indication
that the credit risk had changed in the least after that time.
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Here, the Plaintiffs

are relying on a lost payment

and a payment a few days late to accelerate•

Even though all

the past due money was tendered immediately, the Plaintiffs
moved to file a law suit and enforce the acceleration clause•
Considering the circumstances, a Court of equity should allow
the contract to be paid out in installments as it most certainly
would have been, had not the law suit been filed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

'QptfJL.
Gary^N •/ Anderson
Attorptey for Defendants-Appellants

